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Abstract. Compared to the numerous debates on whether the so-called emerging countries are 
challenging the existing order, comparatively fewer analyses are on offer about what exactly 
these countries are attempting to achieve in various global governance fora. In this article, we 
focus on an area that has not been systematically addressed but is of crucial importance to 
China, India and Brazil: the global governance of genetic resources. All three countries are 
rich in biodiversity and, ever since biotechnology promised to turn DNA into gold, have been 
significant players in the regime complex that governs genetic resources. Shortcomings 
notwithstanding, the establishment of a new access and benefit-sharing regime constitutes a 
rare instance where emerging countries have succeeded in becoming rule-makers of sorts. We 
analyse the ways in which these three countries have sought to pursue their interests in this 
area, especially after the extension of national sovereignty over previously ‘free’ genetic 
resources and the erection of a complex set of rules attempting to regulate access to and benefits 
from their utilisation from the early 1990s onwards. Despite presenting a generally unified 
front in international fora, these countries’ domestic implementation differs significantly and 
raises questions about the continuation of a common international position. Alongside other 
contributions in this special issue, this article adds to our understanding of the nature of 
emerging countries’ engagement with global governance by focusing on the concrete drivers 
and domestic processes that have motivated and shaped the agency of China, India and Brazil 
in this new policy regime.   
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Introduction  
The role played by emerging countries including India, Brazil and more recently China in the 
intellectual property (IP) regime has been widely discussed in the literature (e.g. Correa 2000; 
Drahos 1997; Helfer 2004; Kapczynski 2008; Panagariya 2002; Shadlen 2005; Yu 2004). The 
focus of this body of work has been primarily on contestations on IP and access to health or 
knowledge following the conclusion of the WTO Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994, or on domestic IP legislation. The governance of 
genetic resources has received comparatively less attention despite it being an area of crucial 
importance to China, India, Brazil and other developing countries rich in biodiversity. Genetic 
resources (hereafter GRs) encapsulate material of plant, animal or microbial origin that contains 
the functional units of heredity which, since the emergence of biotechnology in the 1970s, have 
become one of the main sources of value creation. With GRs constituting a new source of 
wealth, conflicts associated with its creation and distribution inevitably followed suit. This was 
so largely because the opening of this new frontier of wealth creation was simultaneously 
accompanied by its rapid enclosure through the use of IP titles – e.g. patents on specific gene 
sequences, plants or entire microorganisms – a process whose fault lines deepened by the 
concentration of GRs in developing countries and biotechnologies (and associated IP titles) in 
developed ones.       
 
In an effort to understand the participation of emerging powers in the new benefit-sharing 
regime that emerged out of these faultlines, we have chosen to focus on China, India and Brazil 
not merely because they are part of that ubiquitous acronym – BRICS – but because, besides 
their recent economic performance, they are three of the 17 largest biologically mega-diverse 
countries (Brazil is the largest).1 They harbour not only large repositories of GRs and traditional 
knowledge 2  associated with them, but also considerable ambitions to develop their own 
biotechnology sectors as a way of capturing part of this new source of wealth. Besides offering 
this unique combination of large (and growing) markets, ambition and great biodiversity, these 
countries have for some time been significant players in the regime complex that governs GRs. 
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A regime complex is understood here as a form of governance characterised by the existence 
of partially overlapping and often inconsistent regimes with no clear hierarchy between them 
(Raustiala and Victor 2004). The GR regime complex, for instance, consists of the IP, 
biodiversity, food, health and trade regimes and includes organisations as diverse as the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 
World Health Organization (WHO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). This institutional proliferation provides opportunities 
for domestic bureaucracies in emerging countries (e.g. national intellectual property offices and 
environmental ministries) to engage internationally and defend particular interests. Sometimes 
this translates into coherent strategies, making use of one particular institution to advance an 
agenda and then pursuing it into another (i.e. regime-shifting), but at times also into less 
coordinated and even contradictory positions held by the same state in different international 
fora. Not all these fora appear in our analysis, but the existence of this regime complex provides 
an invaluable opportunity to understand both the nature of the involvement of these emerging 
countries in global governance fora and how their simultaneous engagement in international 
and domestic conflicts has shaped their policies regarding GRs governance.  
 
Among the various issues fuelling conflicts over GRs, it was one of the main objectives of the 
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) – the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising from the utilisation of GRs – that became the main issue around which a coalition of 
developing countries coalesced from the late 1990s onwards under the leadership of India, 
Brazil and, more recently, China. Being fundamentally a distributional and political issue, the 
seemingly straightforward principle of benefit-sharing from the utilisation of GRs with 
communities and countries from which they were derived proved fiendishly difficult in practice 
and it only became important in the GR regime complex due to the persistence and mobilisation 
of this coalition of developing countries. Their relative success in including access and benefit-
sharing (hereafter ABS) rules at the CBD, WIPO and the WHO mimics regime-shifting 
strategies used earlier by developed countries, especially the now well-known case of shifting 
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IP negotiations away from WIPO during the 1980s to the GATT/WTO where the  TRIPS 
Agreement emerged (Helfer 2004). For our purposes, the continued efforts of this coalition on 
this front and its successes so far could be seen to constitute an instance of emerging countries 
with a comparative advantage in GRs acting as rule-makers rather than rule-takers, at least in 
this area of global governance.   
 
Instead of simply cataloguing the regime-shifting strategies of the part of India, Brazil and more 
recently China, we are interested in understanding how these countries are participating and 
‘making rules’ in this contested area of governance through two related lines of enquiry: firstly,  
we place these more recent contests over the utilisation of GRs in a broader historical context 
characterised until the early/mid-1980s by strong resistance against the commodification of 
GRs by most developing countries; and, secondly, we bring into sharper relief the domestic 
tensions that shape the current position of China, India and Brazil on the issue of GRs 
utilisation. We argue that, despite their undeniable role in the making of current ABS rules, the 
‘rule-making’ on the part of India, Brazil and (more recently) China does not represent a radical 
change in this area of global governance. The ‘rules of the game’ changed radically in the 1980s 
when the commodification of GRs – in the US first and later in other developed countries – 
started making its way into various global governance fora, which is why we revisit this 
historical juncture. Moving our analysis forward, we additionally suggest that despite leading 
efforts regarding the introduction and implementation of ABS rules in multiple governance 
fora, important differences in the domestic policies of China, India and Brazil exist and that 
their participation in this area of global governance cannot be properly understood without 
attention to these domestic dynamics. Our main argument – and our contribution to 
understanding the nature of emerging powers’ participation in global governance – is that such 
participation is simultaneously shaped by domestic and global pressures and, more specifically 
in our case, by the manner in which these states’ competitiveness orientation has found 
expression domestically and internationally in the area of GR utilisation.        
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The first section starts by looking back at the radical change that occurred to the governance of 
GRs in the 1980s with the aim of delineating the shift away from the principle of ‘common 
heritage’ to that of state sovereignty over GRs. An evaluation of the more recent evolution of 
the GRs regime complex and its relationship to the IP regime follows. This second section pays 
particular attention to the efforts of developing countries’ coalitions towards creating a robust 
system of ABS in various international fora during the 2000s. The third section focuses on the 
key economic and political factors that have influenced domestic and international policies 
related to GRs utilisation in China, India and Brazil, respectively. Our analysis is based on a 
multidisciplinary body of work and on interviews with diplomats and policymakers in China, 
India and Brazil between 2012 and 2014. We are keenly aware of the complexities and different 
social, political and economic conditions that characterise China, India and Brazil and do not 
approach our analysis as a standard comparative study. This complexity, and length constraints, 
necessarily make our analysis non-exhaustive. We are also aware that our focus on the state 
and its actions in this area of governance overshadows the agency of international organisations 
and domestic non-state actors; to rectify this shortcoming somewhat, we refer to the latter and 
their interplay with various state actors in the specific country-sections, as and when they are 
important. It is our hope that the article, and its limitations, will offer a first step towards 
understanding what underpins these countries’ participation in the GRs regime complex and 
towards broadening attention to this issue in future research.     
 
 
1. Emerging countries and the evolution of the regime complex governing GRs 
access and benefit-sharing 
Far from resolving the matter, the principle of sharing fairly the benefits arising from the 
utilisation of GRs enshrined in the CBD ushered in an era of contests over how access to GRs 
– most of which are located in the developing world – and benefits from their use should be 
managed and apportioned in practice. As will be seen, in time these contests succeded in 
generating a set of access and benefit-sharing (ABS) rules at the international and national level, 
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but as far as many developing countries are concerned the work is far from over. Of the most 
important recent efforts, for instance, are those led by India, Brazil and China to reconcile 
TRIPS and the CBD through amending the former so that the origin of GRs utilised to develop 
a product/process that is patented is obligatorily disclosed with a view to making benefit-
sharing possible and effective. The intensity of the debates at the WTO TRIPS Council over 
this issue can obfuscate the fact that these efforts do not represent the first instance when 
developing countries have engaged in contests over IP protection and GRs. The CBD and 
TRIPS themselves represent the outcome of previous contestations over issues related to access 
to GRs and technology whose roots go back at least to the 1950s.3 It was during this period that 
the newly independent states simultaneously committed themselves to adhering to inherited IP 
laws as a ‘duty’ of statehood, embraced the concept of GRs as ‘common heritage of humankind’ 
and continued to nurture a strong sense of their genetic patrimony – and much else besides – 
having been looted during colonisation (Okediji 2013; Chatterjee-Miller 2014). These 
contradictory pulls would go on to have significant repercussions on how the issue of GRs and 
IP would be contested from then onwards, including the current conflicts over TRIPS and the 
CBD.     
 
The decolonisation process led not only to the expansion of newly-independent states’ ranks, 
but also to their political mobilisation in international policy regimes bringing into the fold 
issues related to GRs and IP rules as part of a movement for a New International Economic 
Order (Murphy 1983). Partly because these issues fell under the remit of different regimes, and 
partly because biotechnology had yet to emerge as the new profitable technological frontier, 
the articulation of demands over GRs and IP followed somewhat separate trajectories. On the 
one hand, calls for a fairer international IP regime – led by India and Brazil – focused on 
reforming the Berne and Paris Conventions (on copyright and patents) at WIPO to enhance the 
flow of knowledge and technology from frontier to developing countries (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000). On the other hand, calls for a fairer regime for GRs became more pressing at the 
FAO during the 1970s as developing countries saw their own plant GRs, often accessed freely, 
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increasingly penetrate their markets as commodities, largely in the form of hybrid plant 
varieties developed in the more economically-advanced countries (Mooney 1983).  
 
The latter phenomenon was the outcome of a number of complex developments, especially of 
the emergence of seed hybridisation as the technology of choice in frontier economies during 
the early 1900s – and through the Green Revolution, in much of the developing world – and 
related institutional arrangements in the US and most Western European states. These 
eventually resulted in a hierarchy of ‘elite’ and ‘primitive’ plant GRs, the former including 
modified and hybrid varieties protected by private intellectual property rights (e.g. private 
breeders rights), whereas the latter were seen as ‘raw’ plant forms that, conversely, continued 
to be considered the ‘common heritage of humankind’ (Kloppenburg 1988). Pressure applied 
on developing countries by the more advanced counterparts to both guarantee access to ‘raw’ 
GRs as ‘common heritage’ and to adopt private plant breeder rights, led to demands by 
developing countries that FAO prepare a binding international agreement to regulate the flow 
of GRs in 1981. A meagre and, as it turned out, temporary victory appeared to have been 
achieved in the voluntary 1983 FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources that 
confirmed the principle that plant GRs were a heritage of mankind and expanded it to include 
the ‘elite’ commercial cultivars developed in economically-advanved countries (Mooney 
1983). But this success was only one moment in broader transformations that would 
simultaneously heighten contests over GR and bring them head to head with concomitant 
contests over IP rules over the next decade: ten years later, the CBD had been agreed and TRIPS 
followed. Neither mentioned the ‘common heritage’ principle and both confirmed that GRs 
were to be regulated as commodities (Cimoli, et. al 2008). Indeed, many of the developing 
countries that had rejoiced in the 1983 FAO Undertaking either pushed for or agreed during 
CBD negotiations that GRs were commodities whose ownership rested emphatically not with 
humanity, but with them.  
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The shift from the ‘common heritage’ principle to that of states’ sovereignty over GRs was not 
the result of negotiation fatigue or miscalculation. Rather, it must be understood in the context 
of wider transformations taking place in the global economy during the 1970s and 1980s that 
exacerbated (developed and developing) states’ preoccupation with their participation and 
competitive position in world markets. As states started to shift their attention towards 
international competitiveness, they found themselves engaged in increasingly more intense 
conflicts in international policy regimes where the ‘rules of the game’ are made and remade 
(Jessop 2014), including those over IP and GRs.  What is specific about this new context is not 
only the reorientation of states’ role towards competitiveness, but also the heightened 
valorisation of nature which was facilitated by the emergence of biotechnology in the late 1970s 
as a new and promising technological frontier (Smith 2007). Competitive pressures emanating 
from economic and institutional changes aimed at the commercialisation of biotechnology in 
the US from the late 1970s onwards forced other developed and ambitious developing states to 
do the same in an effort to capture part of the economic value created by the opening of this 
new technological frontier.  
 
While achieving this goal was complex in its own right, developing countries rich in 
biodiversity had to deal with an added difficulty that would shape their engagement with the 
global governance of IP and GRs. Although changes to patent rules (initially) in the US had 
transformed the information contained in DNA sequences into a strategic commodity that 
patents were to protect, the success of biotechnology still depended on continued access to GRs 
that were concentrated in what came to be known as mega-diverse countries, some of the largest 
being Brazil, China and India. Not only are these three states rich in biodiversity but they had 
also willingly embraced the competitiveness orientation from the mid/late 1980s onwards 
(Muzaka 2018). As such, the promise of biotechnology became irresistible to them. Rich in 
genetic resources and preoccupied with improving their chances of economic growth and 
competitiveness in world markets made upholding the principle of ‘common heritage’ 
untenable, and the development of their own biotech sectors a key priority.  
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This new orientation shaped their participation in the CBD negotiations and, partly as a result, 
the CBD makes no mention of the ‘common heritage’ principle but rather considers GRs as 
valuable resources. Indeed, this shift had been in the making prior to CBD negotiations: the 
1983 FAO  Undertaking was strongly opposed by developed countries who saw its inclusion 
of ‘elite’ commercial cultivars as part of ‘common heritage’ threating to the competitive 
advantage of their plant breeding and agribusiness sectors (Bordwin 1985; Kloppenburg & 
Kleinman 1987), leading to contests over its interpretation that only abated when three 
resolutions were agreed in 1989 and 1991.4 Attracting hardly any attention, they nonetheless 
signalled a significant shift: all states, including key developing ones, recognised sovereign 
rights over their GRs, while simultaneously recognising the private rights of commercial plant 
breeders (Kloppenburg 2004; Safrin 2004). The CBD simply reinforced this dual property 
regime and brought genetic diversity indisputably under the custodianship of the state guided 
by the principle of utilitarian conservation: the CBD does not restrict access to what is to be 
protected but instead facilitates access and use (Brand & Görg 2013). What is important for our 
purposes it that because both TRIPs and the CBD are based on an understanding that GRs are 
economically valuable resources, developing countries’ efforts to reconcile the two are not over 
incompatible principles but primarily over the concrete ways GRs are to be utilised nationally 
and globally, that is, who should have access to them and their derivatives, under what terms 
and toward what ends.  
 
More specifically, efforts on the part of China, India and Brazil to change the domestic and 
international rules on GRs utilisation are directed both towards enhancing their chances of 
economic growth and competitiveness, and managing the tensions that this orientation creates 
between various social groups. For example, rules such as prior informed consent, benefit-
sharing and certificate of origin for patenting purposes represent not only efforts to gain 
economic rents from GRs, but also to manage tensions between bio-prospectors and various 
traditional, indigenous and other domestic groups. Because all states are simultaneously shaped 
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by conflicts from outside and from within (Cumings 1999; Jessop 2002), our analysis seeks to 
include in its focus the various groups involved in contests over GRs domestically and 
internationally although, as noticed earlier, the level of analysis adopted limits somewhat the 
space needed to do these groups’ involvement full justice. Although they are inseparable in 
practice, for analytical purposes we turn to the efforts of China, India and Brazil in demanding 
the codification of access and benefit sharing (ABS) rules in international fora in the next 
section, before turning to their domestic measures in the following one.  
 
 
2. Regime shifting and the emergence of an incipient international ABS system 
With the CBD and TRIPS entering into force in December 1993 and January 1995 respectively, 
the stage was set for contests over ABS to emerge and engulf not only the CBD and the WTO, 
but also the WIPO, FAO, WHO and the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP).5 The principle 
of adequately compensating providers for the use of their GRs – what became known as the 
ABS principle – was established in the CBD, but had no place in TRIPS. The latter demanded 
all its signatories (most of which are CBD signatories) to introduce patent protection in all areas 
of technology, i.e. including biotechnology. Attempts to solve the power imbalances between 
GRs users (mainly companies from developed countries) and GRs providers (mainly 
developing countries) led developing countries to coalesce around groups such as the Like-
Minded Megadiverse Countries (LMMC), the Like-Minded Asia-Pacific Countries (LMAC), 
the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (LACC), the African Group (AG) and 
the G77 + China. India and Brazil were at the forefront of these efforts since the start; China, 
for reasons that will become clearer in the next section, showed an interest on the issue of GRs 
and associated traditional knowledge (hereafter TK) later.  
 
As early as 1996 India raised concerns about the relation between the two agreements at the 
WTO and UNEP, and since the 1999 WTO Seattle Ministerial reconciling the two on the matter 
of GRs utilisation became one of the main issues contested at the TRIPS Council.6 At the same 
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time, the issue was also raised by developing countries at WIPO, leading to the establishment 
of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore (hereafter WIPO IGC) in 2000. During the following 16 years, various 
coalitions of developing countries led by India and Brazil would shuttle primarily between the  
WTO, WIPO and CBD in order to achieve what had emerged since the late 1990s as their 
preferred approach of reconciling TRIPS and CBD: a legally-binding international instrument 
that would put the burden on GRs users to ensure that resources had been legally acquired in 
consultation with the relevant communities and provider state authorities, and under mutually-
agreed terms that included specific arrangements about how benefits from GRs utilisation 
would be shared with them.        
 
The WTO TRIPS Council became the primary focus of such efforts because of all international 
fora involved in GRs governance, the WTO is the only one with a binding dispute settlement 
mechanism. Apart from being legally-binding, TRIPS came with a built-in agenda that included 
the review of Article 27.3(b), an article which, due to disagreements during negotiations, had 
carved out several exceptions to biotech patenting, namely the permission to exclude plant, 
animals and other higher life forms from patenting. That large and ambitious developing 
countries were not rule-makers at this point became clear as soon as the review process started 
in 1996. Although the opportunity existed to shape the norm of ‘life-patenting’ – still at this 
point a new and by no means widely accepted norm at the international level – India and Brazil 
focused instead on reconciling TRIPS and CBD along the lines mentioned above: specifically, 
through amending TRIPS Article 27.3 or Article 29 (on patent disclosure requirements) to 
secure an effective international ABS system to accompany the utilisation and patenting of 
GRs, i.e. to secure rents from GRs in their territories. Because mandatory disclosure had already 
been discussed during domestic debates in the 1990s (Anadhura et al. 2001), India (and soon 
thereafter Brazil) became the main proponents of reconciling TRIPS and CBD through 
amending Art. 29 of TRIPS to include mandatory disclosure of origin and prior informed 
consent as criteria for the patentability of innovations based on GRs.7   
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Immediately labelled ‘the fourth patentability criteria’,8 the mandatory disclosure proposal was 
opposed by the US and other developed countries (e.g. Canada, Australia and Japan) and 
remains so to this day. Encouraged by the turn of events that led to the new WTO Doha Round 
launched as a ‘developmental round’ in 2001 and their success on the IP-access to medicines 
front that same year (Muzaka 2011), developing countries concentrated their efforts at the 
TRIPS Council and ABS negotiations at the CBD.9 Of the latter, negotiations over the Nagoya 
Protocol were particularly difficult and agreement was only achieved under intense pressure 
and fear of credibility-loss in case of non-agreement.10 Although the 2010 Nagoya Protocol 
provided more clarity on how the hitherto vague CBD objective of ensuring fair sharing of 
benefits from GRs use was to be achieved, it left many developing countries unsatisfied. 
Ultimately, the Protocol put the ball back into the national governments’ court, asking them to 
set domestic ABS legislation regarding the terms of access to GRs, benefit-sharing, prior 
consent rules and so on.11 Part of the reason for this dissatisfaction was that efforts on the part 
of some developing countries led by India and Brazil to name patent offices as mandatory 
national checkpoints to capture non-compliance with ABS rules of user and provider countries 
– a strategy they had followed in parallel to amending TRIPS along the lines mentioned earlier 
– were unsuccessful.  
 
Deflated by the Nagoya outcome and with the successful completion of the WTO Doha Round 
appearing increasingly unlikely by 2010, developing countries’ coalitions on ABS and GRs 
renewed their efforts at the WIPO IGC. Until then, the Committee’s work had progressed 
somewhat on issues related to TK and folklore, but lagged behind on issues related to GRs. 
Developed countries, the US key among them, opposed a mandatory requirement mechanism 
while developing countries, led by India and Brazil, insisted on it.12 IGC’s decade-long work 
on GRs had generated a number of technical analyses of mandatory disclosure requirements, 
draft IP guidelines for ABS and draft patent examination guidelines with a view to preventing 
erroneously granted patents and ensuring compliance with ABS rules. But as the new decade 
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opened, developing countries started to argue that time had come for a diplomatic conference 
to be convened by WIPO towards concluding a legal instrument for the protection of GRs and 
TK, including the mandatory disclosure mechanism as the preferred means of ensuring 
compliance with incipient national and international ABS rules. Initially envisaged for 2012,13 
the deadline has repeatedly moved forward due to lack of consensus and, for the moment, it 
will be considered again by the WIPO General Assembly in September 2019.14  
 
This avenue may prove more successful, not least because some developed countries (e.g. 
Switzerland, Norway and to a lesser extent the EU) have shown more flexibility towards 
demands by developing countries on the homologation of TRIPS and the CBD. Moreover, as a 
longstanding participant in these debates observed,15 large developing countries started shifting 
their approach towards GRs utilisation by the time the Nagoya Protocol was concluded towards 
facilitating user countries’ access, not least because they had become user countries themselves. 
Perhaps the most important reason why this avenue may bear some fruit is the change in China’s 
position at WIPO. China’s interest in supporting and internationalising its traditional medicine 
sector and a number of cases of misappropriation of Chinese TK explains why “China felt 
threatened and decided to join the coalition… This is very interesting as during WIPO 
negotiations China was never aggressive. On the Intergovernmental Committee, China was 
always removed. So, in a way they were free riding, but now they have changed their position 
and this matters because of their weight”.16  
 
While the outcomes of the WIPO IGC process remain to be seen, developing countries, and 
India and Brazil in particular, continue to push for an effective ABS system based on the 
mandatory disclosure of GRs’ origin at the TRIPS Council and at the CBD meetings. Although 
they have not achieved this goal yet – given the complexity of the international regime 
governing GRs and, as we shall see, multiple and conflicting domestic demands – the 
emergence of an international ABS system and the widespread recognition of the need for its 
improvement are not small feats.  Their success on this front in the future will depend on their 
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ability to maintain strong coalitions among themselves and with other developing countries, as 
well as their ability to resolve their domestic conflicts over the use of GRs.  
 
 
3. GR governance and ABS rules in China, India and Brazil  
China  
Of Deng Xiaoping’s much-discussed reform programme (1978-1989), the most relevant to our 
discussion are changes to China’s legal and institutional framework, and its approach to the 
then-emerging biotechnology. Mao’s legacy in China’s legal system had been the nullification 
of earlier legal modernisation reforms, hence Deng’s efforts to introduce anew a whole raft of 
laws, including environmental regulation and IP laws (Cheung 2009). This legal vacuum and 
China’s absence in international environmental and IP fora were addressed relatively rapidly 
during the reform period; among the first countries to ratify the CBD, China also joined most 
international conventions on biodiversity and introduced domestic biodiversity-related laws. 
Additionally, it built a national IP regime – under intense pressure from the US – in the run-up 
to its WTO entry in 2001 (McBeath and Tse-Kang 2006; Serrano 2016). The broader aim of 
Deng’s legal and institutional reforms was the establishment of a more predictable 
administrative legal framework capable of rationalising governance, enhancing administrative 
efficiency and reining in local governments (Peerenboom 2002; 2004). The latter issue has by 
no means been resolved; it is well-known that the relationship between the Communist Party, 
the central and local governments continues to generate internal conflicts that, in turn, have had 
implications on China’s approach to GRs governance and ABS rules.   
 
Deng’s reforms were also meant to build the institutional framework that his Four 
Modernisations strategy – modernisation of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 
defence – needed to succeed. Science was to provide the route to ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’, thanks to a small group of scientists having succeed in persuading Deng that 
major investments were vital to the success of the Four Modernisations strategy (Keeley 2005). 
 15 
The aim of the ensuing 863 National High-Tech Programme established in 1986 was to enable 
China to co-opt the new sciences before they came to be dominated by the West and especially 
the US. Biotechnology headed the list of priority areas: the double-helix became the symbol of 
China’s high-tech drive and the development of the Chinese biotech sector an integral part of 
its modernisation vision (Smith 2000). That this commitment remains strong is clear in data 
indicating that nearly 20 percent of the total science and technology investment goes to research 
in the life sciences and biotechnology (Chen et al. 2007). Moreover, overall spending in R&D 
has increased to over two percent of GDP – double that of India and Brazil – making China’s 
R&D spending in absolute terms second only to the US (Ni 2015).  
 
Despite a more ambiguous picture on the ground, China’s biotechnology revolution is generally 
held as a remarkable example of what its targeting of a priority area supported by a strong 
network of policymakers and scientists – and, importantly, generous public R&D investment – 
can achieve.  Indeed, China is often singled out on account of it having developed the largest 
plant biotechnology capacity outside North America (Huang et al. 2002; Chen et al. 2007). In 
the late 1990s, the Chinese government was already investing over US$100 million on plant 
biotechnology annually, ten times the total investment (public and private) in Brazil and five 
times that in India (Huang et al. 2002: 675). Such levels are important, but so too is recognising 
an idiosyncratic element of China’s approach to plant biotech: the state’s tight control not only 
over China’s GRs, but also of its plant breeding programme and, more broadly, of its biotech 
sector overall. State control over GRs in fact predates the CBD and derives from land ownership 
rights established during Mao’s land reform of the early 1950s and the more recent 1998 reform 
of the communal system (The Economist 2013). Given that it enshrined the sovereign right over 
GRs in a nation’s territory, the CBD ratification in 1993 posed no difficulties for China 
(McBeath & Tse-Kang 2006), not to mention the fact that the CBD placed no burdensome 
obligations to preserve biodiversity on its members.  
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The FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture of 2001, 
however, clashed significantly with China’s approach to plant GRs. Unlike India and Brazil 
that were driving the negotiations, China has not yet become a party because, unlike the CBD, 
it provides multilateral access to a wide repository of agricultural GRs which in China are 
considered strategic resources controlled tightly by the state. These agricultural GRs are not 
generally available to private breeders;  other countries can only access them on the basis of 
specific agreements that define the purpose of use, IP, ABS rules and other matters (Zhang 
2012). So embedded are concerns of preserving self-sufficiency and food security that the 
development of an indigenous agricultural biotech was prioritised under the 863 Programme 
since the start because the control of the seed and plant breeding industry by foreign companies 
was seen as a danger of a higher magnitude than that posed by advanced weaponry (Keeley 
2005: 159). As noted, unlike India and Brazil, the state not only accounts for nearly all of 
China’s plant biotech research expenditure, but the vast majority of the biotech sector is also 
under its control. The entry of transnational life-science companies is not altogether forbidden 
but rather managed with a view to developing biotech R&D capacities and always in 
partnerships with a Chinese partner, e.g. the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences, or state-owned enterprises at the national or local level.17  
 
Apart from agricultural biotech, another sector to which the Chinese state has devoted 
significant resources is drug development based on traditional Chinese medicine. Systematic 
efforts to modernise traditional medicine production and to internationalise this sector have 
been accompanied by R&D investment that have led to several novel drugs (Chen et al. 2007). 
The best-known have been an anti-malaria drug derived from artemisinin 18  and alkaloids 
isolated from Chinese herbal medicine for Alzheimers, developments which, in turn, led to 
increased state investment in the sector. Like agri-biotech, the modern-traditional medicine 
sector has become “a pillar of [China’s] new innovation-driven economic growth model” (FT 
2015). The expected contribution of this sector has only served to heighten the importance of 
control over GRs to the Chinese government. Likewise, evidence of cases of misappropriation 
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of GRs related to traditional Chinese medicines and TK associated with them contributed to the 
Chinese state taking a rather more proactive role internationally. Cases of misappropriation 
included Harvard University’s collection of large blood samples in the Anhui Province (Xue 
2005), research on active ingredients found in traditional Chinese medicine by foreign 
companies (Torri & Herrmann 2011), and, perhaps more importantly, the granting of over 150 
patents to non-Chinese entities on 23 of the most commonly used Chinese medicinal plants 
around the world (Wu et al. 2013). An assertive China on issues of GR utilisation and ABS 
rules was no longer news as the first decade of 2000s was coming to a close.19   
  
The governance of GRs in China has not been simply ‘statist’, but also fragmented and 
characterised by competition between diverse local and central interest groups. These 
characteristics provide some insights towards explaining China’s recent international shift on 
GRs and ABS issues. The case of the CBD Nagoya Protocol is particularly instructive. During 
the Protocol negotiations, the Chinese delegation played largely an observing role and 
practically never took any initiative. 20  Even after the Nagoya Protocol was concluded, 
ratification at home was effectively blocked due to conflicting interests and overlapping 
competences of different ministries (Zhang 2012). To give an idea of the magnitude of this 
challenge, the National Committee for Biodiversity Conservation – the top decision making 
body on biodiversity – consists of 26 different ministries. In addition, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection is a very recent creation, having replaced the lower-ranking State 
Environmental Protection Agency only in 2008. Large and more established Ministries (e.g. 
Agriculture, Commerce, Foreign Affairs and the National Development and Reform 
Commission) with high stakes on GRs have made reaching consensus over the Nagoya Protocol 
a difficult task (Czarnezki and Yu 2013).    
 
Conflict and competition is not only inter-ministerial, but takes place also between central and 
local actors. This fragmented and conflictual polity, alongside the use of experimentation and 
pilot-projects so characteristic of Chinese governance, have seen the emergence of a number of 
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initiatives related to GRs and ABS on the ground. Collective land rights, for instance, have 
made possible innovative forms of agreement to share GRs benefits through a community fund 
(Vernooy & Ruiz 2013: 108). Geographical Indications21 have been used to further collective 
production and benefit sharing as in the case of waxy maize in Guanxi province. A series of 
National Pilot Projects for IP Protection of TK were launched in 2008 covering 15 counties, 
municipalities or regions, e.g. the Hubei and Sichuan provinces (Cabrera Medaglia et al. 2014). 
Other approaches have been tried, including private-public partnerships; e.g. the Foreign 
Economic Cooperation Office has promoted biodiversity conservation cooperation between 
local governments and the private sector in coastal areas such as Shanghai, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang, where numerous export-oriented companies are nominally interested in corporate 
social responsibility projects.22 This incipient ABS system no doubt prepared the ground for 
the eventual ratification of the Nagoya Protocol, but it would be difficult to ascertain when this 
would have occurred had it not been for a strong push by the central government in mid-2016. 
China ratified Nagoya in June 2016 so that it would come into effect by the time it hosted the 
G20 summit in Hangzhou in September, when it also reached the bilateral agreement with the 
US on climate change that opened the way to the Paris climate change deal in the same year. 
The Nagoya ratification, then, was the result of a broader shift towards international activism 
on climate change on the part of the current Xi Jinping’s administration, which has also 
launched numerous environmental reforms to achieve what it calls ‘ecological civilization’.23 
 
Challenges related to the Nagoya Protocol were largely domestic, but rather than arising from 
societal forces, they reflected the particularities of the Chinese polity and the institutional shifts 
that have taken place since the reform period. As noted, the adoption of the Protocol – the most 
advanced international instrument on ABS to date – was the result of a number of such shifts, 
especially of growing state concern over GRs misappropriation and its ambition to support its 
biotech and traditional medicine sector, both of which led to decisive action on the part of the 
central government to ratify the Protocol even if belatedly. Underneath these broader concerns, 
others were and continue to be raised and pushed by different actors: far from a monolith, the 
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Chinese state is a collection of competing ministries, diverse local and national interests based 
on strong informal links with a dynamic form of private networked capitalism, sometimes 
called Sino-Capitalism (McNally 2012). This political economy also allows for a large degree 
of experimentation and cut-throat competition which goes some way towards explaining 
inaction in some fronts and, simultaneously, the development of innovative forms of benefit-
sharing which in time found their way into an incipient national ABS legislation that eventually 
prepared the ground for China’s more assertive participation in international ABS contests.  
 
India  
One of the issues on which governments of various political orientations in post-1991 India 
have unanimously agreed is that the development of the biotech sector is in India’s national 
interest. Almost unanimously, Indian policymakers have come to see biotech as a ‘technology 
of hope’, a powerful enabling technology that would not only revolutionise agriculture and 
health in India, but also help establish it as a knowledge superpower in the world (Newell 2003; 
GoI 2007). Although this vision would come to the fore from the 1990s onwards, the Indian 
state had paid close attention to developments in biotechnology and IP trends in the US and 
other developed economies throughout the 1970s and 1980s. It responded to such developments 
relatively rapidly: it included biotech as a new priority area in its 6th Five Year Plan (1980-85), 
set up the National Biotechnology Board in 1982 and established the Long-Term Plan in 
Biotechnology of 1983 (Kumar et al. 2004). Significant public investments in the biotech sector 
followed: e.g. investment in human and physical infrastructure, financing direct R&D in public 
labs and universities, creating technology and science parks, offering tax breaks and other 
measures to push businesses and public scientists towards biotech innovation and 
commercialisation (Mueller 2008). Considerable public investment in this emerging sector was 
consistent with substantial investments made earlier in ‘big science’ and high-tech sectors; they 
were unusually high for a country with relatively high poverty and illiteracy rates, but the Indian 
state saw such measures then, and now, as central to improving India’s economic fortunes and 
its rise to greater global prominence (Alamgir 2009). Its early orientation towards the 
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development and commercialisation of biotechnology, alongside its wealth of biodiversity 
underpinned India’s reservations about the ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle during the 
mid-1980s and its decisive move towards the principle of national ownership from then 
onwards (Rajan 1994).  
  
Unlike China, the commitment to create a competitive Indian biotech sector had to contend 
since the start with an increasingly stronger environmental movement that included concerns 
about the looting of India’s biological diversity during colonisation and after (Krishanswamy 
2011; Nayar 2015). In this charged domestic context, the CBD negotiations during the 1980s 
and early 1990s offered the Indian state an opportunity to pursue a simultaneously assertive and 
defensive strategy: to deal with the issue of biodiversity that, as Indian environmental groups 
had been arguing at least since the early 1980s, required protection from new forms of 
misappropriation (e.g. biopiracy), and to pursue more assertive goals. The latter included 
demands that access to GRs be made conditional upon the transfer of technologies developed 
by biotech companies in advanced economies in line with its aim of developing an indigenous 
biotech sector in India (Rajan 1994).  
 
Although Indian polity is very different to the Chinese one, it is remarkable that India’s new 
orientation towards a more open and competitive economy – starting with internal liberalisation 
reforms during the 1980s and including cautious external liberalisation reforms from the 1990s 
onwards – was an ‘elite coup’ led by a powerful executive-technocratic elite within the state 
that played a fundamental role in formulating and pushing the reform process forward from 
behind the scenes (Mukherji 2012; Kohli 2006).24 Importantly for our purposes, the break with 
the past orientation was based in no small measure on the hope that the scientific, technological 
and industrial capacities developed until then would provide the basis on which to compete in 
high-tech sectors in world markets. Bound into the vision of India becoming a competitive 
knowledge economy was the reform of the Indian IP and biodiversity regime so as to enable 
Indian firms to compete and succeed in world markets.  
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In line with this orientation, India adopted an offensive-defensive GRs strategy aimed 
simultaneously at resisting acts of biopiracy fueled by a nationalist indignation against 
neocolonial expropriation, and at becoming a competitive player in global biotech markets itself 
(Rajan 2006).  Steadfast in its resolve to convert India’s biodiversity “into economic wealth for 
the country” (Dutfield 2004: 175), the Indian state acted to defend the GRs now firmly under 
its control: in two highly-publicised cases, it challenged patents issued by the US patent office 
on turmeric and basmati rice and succeeded in their revocation or limitation in 1997 and 2001 
respectively, a move that besides boosting its anticolonial credentials at home also strengthened 
the case for more ‘robust’ IP laws in India so as to protect Indian TK and GRs. These efforts 
were accompanied by a state-run Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, a library documenting 
TK across India since 2001 and currently running to over 30 million pages (Krishanswamy 
2011). In parallel, the Indian state negotiated deals with foreign patent offices granting them 
access to such records for examination purposes, while, as discussed earlier, taking a leading 
role in international GRs contests demanding that TRIPS and the CBD are linked via an 
international and legally-binding disclosure of origin regime for GRs. 
 
The tensions inherent in simultaneously protecting GRs and becoming a global biotech power 
became apparent in efforts to modify the domestic IP system – meant to turn India’s intellectual 
prowess into wealth (Drahos 2010) – and were particularly visible in 2002. In this year, the 
Indian state approved the first genetically-modified (GM) seed despite a very strong anti-GM 
civil society campaign (Newell 2003; Ramanna 2006). This watershed decision was 
accompanied by two no less important acts:  the Biodiversity Act enacting the CBD, and a new 
amendment to the patent law. The latter prohibited the patenting of TK and requested that patent 
applications disclosed the origin of relevant GRs – making India among the earliest adopters of 
this means of linking IP and biodiversity laws – but at the same time it also brought 
microorganisms and biotech processes within the remit of patentable matter. This expansion of 
patentability was in line with the government’s position that biotech patenting is indispensable 
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to the development of India’s biotech sector, a position at odds with India’ socio-cultural 
tradition that opposes ‘life-patenting’ (Scoones 2002; Rajan 2006). Like all amendments to 
India’s IP regime proposed by the government since the mid-1990s, this act was fiercely 
opposed by civil society groups and, although supported by key departments, e.g. the 
Department of Industrial Policy, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the 
Department of Biotechnology, the Ministry of Science and Technology and that of Agriculture, 
it was also opposed by other state agencies, most notably the Ministry of Environment and that 
of Health (Muzaka 2017). Resistance was partly overcome through an agreement to consider 
civil society groups’ requests to narrow the scope of microorganism – which TRIPS does not 
define – by an expert group that eventually ruled it as inconsistent with TRIPS in 2007 and 
again in 2009 (Mueller 2008; Basheer 2009).  
    
That this decision had much to do with the importance the Indian government attached to the 
development of a modern biotech sector – and the role of IP protection in it – is evident not 
only in continued support for the sector, but also in the fact that public agencies have emerged 
as the most aggressive market players in it. In a sector characterised by a large number of private 
companies, it is worthy of note that the most prolific domestic patent-holders are not Indian 
private companies, but rather government departments, state-owned companies and public 
research laboratories, most notably CSIR, incidentally, one of the largest public research 
networks in the world (Rajan 2005; Dutz 2007). Although the 2002 patent amendment act made 
TK non-patentable, many such patents have been granted to public laboratories and, in the case 
of the modern-traditional Auyverdic medicine sector, to Indian private companies, too (Pordié 
& Gaudillière 2014). The 2002 Geographical Indications Act, officially justified to prevent the 
misappropriation of products developed over time by local communities (e.g. basmati, 
Darjeeling tea), proved no different: by the end of the 2000s, most of the nearly 130 GIs issued 
were registered by a state department or agency (Krishnaswamy 2011).  
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In addition to the state’s appropriation of IP titles over India’s GRs, control over them was 
further secured in the 2002 Biodiversity Act which, as the CBD it was implementing, placed 
no obstacles to their commodification. Notably, it set up a system to police access to genetic 
material on the part of foreigners, suggesting that the problem was not the appropriation of GRs 
per se, but rather its beneficiaries. At the helm of the system controlling access to GRs stands 
the National Biodiversity Board, an agency of a state with a poor record of protecting the rights 
of traditional/indigenous communities (Randeria 2007). As a matter of fact, the 2002 
Biodiversity Act does worse than the CBD in recognising these rights: despite going through a 
decade-long process of activism on the part of civil society and although a three-tier structure 
was enshrined in the Act giving local communities a role to play in biodiversity management, 
they have yet to play such role. Indeed, of over 300 cases approved by the Board by the late 
2000s, no cases of benefit-sharing with local communities had been concluded, nor had they 
been properly involved in the approval process (Kohli et al. 2009). 
 
Having already enacted the CBD and set up a domestic regime to regulate access to GRs along 
the general lines discussed here and pushing for the same in international fora, the Indian state 
had no difficulty in ratifying the Nagoya Protocol in 2012, one of the first countries to do so. 
The Protocol, like the CBD, is framed in India as a means of halting the exploitation of its GRs 
by foreigners and, as noted, it defers to national GRs and ABS legislation which India had 
already set in place. When it announced the ratification, the Environment Minister boasted that 
India had “a great deal to offer to the world in terms of … protecting biodiversity with the active 
participation of the local communities” (Natarajan, quoted in Suchitra 2012). As discussed, 
local communities are not the protagonists of India’s approach to GRs. Despite active 
opposition at home, this approach has been primarily shaped by the unwavering commitment 
of the Indian state to the development of a biotech sector capable of competing in global markets 
(Muzaka 2018). This ambition, coupled with a pronounced sensibility related to neocolonialism 





Brazil was the first country to ratify the CBD in 1994, signalling an important shift in 
orientation towards international environmental issues during the mid-1980s. Only a decade 
earlier, the Brazilian military government had made it clear at the UN Conference on 
Environment in Stockholm that it regarded calls to preserve the Amazon rainforest as attacks 
on Brazil’s sovereignty (Keck 2002). If earlier international environmental concerns were 
invariably framed as a renewed foreign ploy to take control over the Amazon, Brazil’s 
economic crisis and the democratisation of its political and social structures during the 1980s 
generated a long-lasting shift in Brazilian discourse on the sustainable use of natural resources, 
the most visible sign of which was Brazil playing host to the Earth Summit in 1992 from where 
the CBD emerged (Garfied 2013). At the same time, not unlike in China and India, the civilian 
government had by the late 1980s determined that Brazil’s new growth strategy was to be based 
on the competitive insertion of its economy in world markets, a strategy that strongly 
emphasised the application of science, technology and innovation in high-tech sectors 
(Pedersen 2008; Leiva 2008). Despite this emphasis, and having one of the largest reserves of 
biodiversity in the world, biotechnology became a sector of special significance only in the 
early 2000s. Following the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, the return to industrial policy in the 
early 2000s highlighted the biotech sector as a ‘gateway to the future’ and a ‘frontier 
technology’ (PITCE 2003), followed by increased state support for the sector which 
consolidated further with the launch of the Biotechnology Development Policy in 2007.  
 
Although systematically supported since the early 2000s, the state’s involvement in the sector 
has a much longer history, as visible in the successful Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation (Embrapa) established in 1973 and the 1975 ProÁlcool Programme that would 
eventually contribute to Brazil becoming a key player in the world biofuels market (Nastari 
1983; Nehring 2016). Following the emergence of the modern biotech sector in developed 
economies, the Brazilian state responded by including biotechnology as one of the key sectors 
 25 
in its Programme for Scientific and Technological Development during the 1985-1995 period, 
but funds were hard to come by in the aftermath of the debt crisis. Nonetheless, a significant 
research infrastructure was already in place in Brazil and, importantly, in the Amazon thanks 
to the persistence of a small group of Brazilian scientists and conservationists who had 
convinced consecutive governments of the potential importance of the Amazon’s resources for 
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors (Garfield 2013). As the vision of Brazil becoming 
‘the great biotech and environmental power of the 21st century’ took shape during the 2000s 
(e.g. Lula 2007), efforts towards supporting the biotech sector multiplied, as did public 
financing and programmes and agencies aimed at transforming the Amazon’s biodiversity into 
high value-added products (Coutinho et al. 2001; Bound 2008). 
 
Following the ratification of the CBD – and in line with its ‘conservation through utilisation’ 
approach – a number of projects were initiated primarily in the Amazon basin during the 1990s. 
They generated hardly any economic benefits but plenty of headaches for the Brazilian state. 
One particularly problematic front emerged in the form of indigenous communities’ resistance 
against such projects taking place without their consent during the Cardoso administrations 
(1995-2002) (Eimer et al. 2016), not to  mention the fact that many (but not all) consider the 
idea of GRs commercialisation as incompatible with their traditions.25 Just as the discourse on 
the environment changed during the 1980s, that on indigenous communities living in the 
Amazon changed, too: often seen as a hindrance to the country’s development, they now 
emerged as defenders of the national biogenetic patrimony and as a fountain of knowledge that 
could propel Brazil into knowledge economy status (Conklin 2002). This new-found status was 
not only discursive, but also legal. Although the CBD vested states with ultimate control over 
GRs, the new 1988 Constitution considered GRs as a component of the environment and thus 
as a collective good, while also recognising indigenous communities’ prior land rights and 
ownership of TK associated with GRs (Gross 2014).          
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A second front of resistance reinforcing the first emerged in the form of legal proposals on 
CBD’s implementation that sought to make its optional endorsement of indigenous groups’ 
consent into a mandatory requirement. The most influential of these was made in 1995 by 
Congresswoman Marina Silva – a notable environmental figure in Brazil – followed by even 
further-reaching proposals by PT (Workers Party) representatives (Velez 2010). Such proposals 
clashed with Cardoso’s aim of preserving the Executive’s powers over this matter, but although 
all state agencies agreed that GRs should be utilised towards economic goals, the degree of 
indigenous communities’ involvement was strongly disputed and supported primarily by the 
Ministry of the Environment and the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Eimer et al. 2016). It is 
difficult to evaluate how long this turf war would have lasted. Due to widespread anger about 
the plundering of Brazil’s biodiversity that erupted on evidence of an unfavourable contract 
signed between a public agency and a foreign pharmaceutical company,26 Cardoso was forced 
to issue a Provisional Measure in 2000 which effectively implemented the CBD and, through 
numerous resolutions, ushered in an ABS system in Brazil. 
 
The Council for Managing Genetic Patrimony (CGEN) – a body involving 19 ministries and 
federal institutions – took control over access to GRs in 2002, marking the point in time when 
various groups, key amongst them Brazilian scientists, started criticising the state’s ‘heavy-
handed’ approach towards GRs as contributing to Brazil’s loss of competitiveness (Biominas 
2011; Filoche 2012). Initially, the object of criticism was the near impossibility of accessing 
GRs but this argument lost its strength as the state progressively and silently loosened its grip 
and Brazilian researchers secured preferential access to them. Soon after CGEN became 
operative, the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources 
became responsible for considering applications to access GRs for non-commercial purposes 
and it not only issued a large number of authorisations, but also ‘special dispensations’ for 
Brazilian public research institutes (Filoche 2012). Other state agencies got increasingly 
involved in issuing GRs authorisations, totaling around 1,300 in 2013, of which nearly half was 
for research purposes (Gross 2014: 23). In light of this shift, criticism moved to the manner in 
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which Brazil’s IP system forbade Brazilian researchers and companies to patent inventions 
based on the nation’s biodiversity, whereas foreign companies – whose access remains 
conditional on formal cooperation with a national entity – could nevertheless do so in countries 
where it was possible, e.g. the US (Octaviani 2010). In such framing, widely supported by the 
nascent (private) biotech sector, concerns about loss of competitiveness gained more strength 
by virtue of appearing simultaneously as a fight against biopiracy.  
 
Following targeted state support for the sector since 2003, and despite the fact that the sector is 
largely controlled by foreign companies, the number of private Brazilian biotech companies 
grew, especially in areas of human health and agriculture (Biominas 2011). As the first decade 
of 2000s was coming to a close, these companies, supported by some Brazilian scientists, 
sought to rectify limitations on life-patenting in Brazil’s IP law.27 Unlike most developed and 
ambitious developing countries (e.g. India), Brazil’s 1996 IP law does not allow patents on 
naturally-occurring life forms such as gene sequences and microorganisms, unless modified by 
human intervention. This was largely the outcome of contests over ‘life-patenting’ during the 
1990s that had brought together in opposition a wide coalition of groups including environment 
NGOs, trade unions, scientific institutes and the Catholic Bishops Conference (Shadlen 2017). 
Widespread concerns that the national biotech sector was not strong enough to compete with 
foreign companies who would, in turn, appropriate Brazil’s GRs through patenting were also 
key in the opposition movement carrying the day (Filoche 2012). Similar concerns also guided 
state’s position on GM seeds during the late 1990s: transgenic research was permitted as a 
means of supporting Brazilian scientific competitiveness, but GM planting was not, with a view 
to allowing time for Brazilian agro-biotech firms to develop their own seed varieties and 
competitive strengths (Jepson 2002). Following the entry of Monsanto into the Brazilian seed 
market in 1998, a trenchant battle over GM would sweep across state agencies, the judiciary, 
civil society groups and farmers until hopes for a GM-free Brazil were effectively buried in 
2005; since then, over 28 GM varieties of soybean, cotton and corn have been approved, making 
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Brazil the second largest producer of GM soya worldwide by 2011 and the developing country 
with the largest GM crop area in the world by 2015 (Peschard 2012; James 2015).    
 
The international success of Brazil’s agricultural sector threw an unexpected spanner in the 
work Brazil had done, alongside India and South Africa, in getting the Nagoya Protocol off the 
ground at the CBD. Following the 2000 Provisional Measure, a number of resolutions and 
clarifications on the part of CGEN regarding prior informed consent, access permits, benefit-
sharing requirements and, as Brazil had been demanding internationally, mandatory origin 
disclosure for GRs relevant to patent applications, had set up a national – if, as seen by many, 
cumbersome – ABS system. Despite such a system, many in Brazil were unsupportive of 
ratifying the Nagoya Protocol until a more effective national ABS system was put in place 
(Alisson 2015). Attempts to create a new Biodiversity Law on the part of the executive branch 
since 2009, however, were repeatedly resisted by agribusiness interest groups, supported by the 
influential bancada ruralista in Congress and the Ministry of Agriculture, largely on the 
grounds that ABS rules – national and, through the Nagoya Protocol, international – may lead 
to claims of benefit-sharing for GRs on which Brazil’s agribusiness success is built, the vast 
majority of which (e.g. soy, sugar, microorganisms used in the food and biofuel sector etc.) are 
not native to Brazil.28  Although the new Biodiverisity Law that finally passed in 2015 swung 
the pendulum unmistakably in favour of those in the business of manipulating GRs as compared 
to the earlier Provisional Measure, it did not alleviate agribusiness concerns, while exacerbating 
those of indigenous communities who continue to resist its implementation (Welch 2015). 
Hopes that it would finally open the way to Brazil ratifying the Nagoya Protocol remain 
unfulfilled, while the corruption scandals that have rocked the new Brazilian government have 
seemingly put such hopes even further out of reach.  
  
 
4. Concluding thoughts 
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It would not be an exaggeration to argue that there exists an international system for access and 
benefit-sharing related to GRs today due to the efforts of key developing countries, India and 
Brazil most notable among them. Taking a leaf from the negotiating rulebooks of their more 
economically-advanced counterparts, this international system of rules has developed into a 
regime complex, with the WTO, CBD and WIPO currently the most important fora. Not only 
are the ‘regime-shifting’ strategies of India, Brazil and, more recently China, in this area of 
governance similar to those of developed countries, but the ABS rules pertaining to GRs can 
hardly be said to offer a radically different paradigm of governing GRs to that preferred by 
developed countries. As noted, there are no disputes over the principle of access to and 
commodification of GRs: on this fundamental issue, developing countries were active rule-
takers in the 1980s and 1990s. The main exception that emerged post-CBD relates to the issue 
of benefit-sharing from utilisation of GRs; as our analysis of China, India and Brazil suggests, 
the abandonment of the ‘common heritage’ principle, the acceptance of the principle of GR 
commodification/utilisation and efforts to create an international ABS regime have little to do 
with lack of alternatives than with a drive – differently expressed in the three countries – to 
accrue rents from the possession of GRs and develop in time domestic biotech sectors capable 
of competing in world markets. In all these respects – apart from the ‘common heritage’ 
principle that clearly benefitted developed countries – these emerging economies’ participation 
in GR governance is not driven by fundamentally different principles to their more advanced 
counterparts, suggesting that they have no intention of radically changing the constitutive rules 
of global governance, but primarily making it work in their favour.  
 
We have seen that, at a basic level, it has been this concern with their competitive position in 
global markets in general and of their biotech sectors in particular that has shaped these 
countries’ participation in the governance of GRs, especially that over ABS rules. This 
preoccupation with international competitiveness has also been accompanied by the urgency of 
rectifying the injustices if not of colonial than of  neo-colonial expropriation through changing 
those principles and rules of global GR governance that are perceived to have facilitated such 
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expropriation, e.g. the principle of ‘common heritage of mankind’ and the absence of ABS rules 
for GR utilisation. It is tempting to suggest that the recent activism and relative success on the 
part of China, India and Brazil in this area of global governance is strictly related to their new-
found status as emerging powers; our reason for embedding the analysis in a historical 
perspective was precisely to show that India and Brazil, at least, have been seen as leaders of 
the developing world in this area since the 1950s despite their relatively more modest economic 
weight compared to today. The outcomes of their efforts in changing the rules of international 
policy regimes in the past and present cannot be evaluated simply by the rather crude indicator 
of rising economic weight, but rather by paying attention to the changing dynamics in the global 
economy – e.g. the further opening of global markets, the rise of the competitiveness state 
orientation, the increased commodification of knowledge (IP) and the emergence of biotech as 
a new technological and wealth frontier – and to the manner in which these ever-changing 
dynamics combine with domestic pressures to generate specific position, strategies, coalitions 
and outcomes rather than others.  
 
It is this mode of investigation that led us to attempt to uncover some of the main domestic 
pressures and conflicts that have shaped these countries’ position in GRs governance. In the 
case of China, we saw that such pressures stem primarily from the peculiarities of its polity. 
Paradoxically for what is often seen as a centralised system, a multiplicity of actors at the central 
level and the local level for a long time effectively blocked the emergence of a nation-wide 
ABS system in China. Decisive action on the part of highest echelons of the central government 
opened the way for the ratification and the Nagoya Protocol and, with it, for a more systematic 
approach to ABS building upon some of the existing pilot cases. Access to and utilisation of 
China’s GRs is likely to remain tightly controlled by the state for some time to come; the 
importance of the biotech and traditional medicine sectors and fears of GRs misappropriation 
will likely support this stance in the future which, in turn, may see China becoming more 
assertive internationally and bilaterally on GRs contests.  
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In India, indignation against neocolonialism and biopiracy runs deeper still; this has allowed 
the state to frame its approach to GRs and ABS rules as a tool of dealing with foreign 
misappropriation of India’s GRs, but it has not given it an altogether easy ride. Domestic 
opposition from environmental and other social groups has been temporarily overcome by the 
centralisation of biotechnology policies in central state agencies many of which, at the same 
time, have emerged as the most active players in the biotech and IP markets. The view and 
rights of indigenous/traditional communities have been largely ignored, unless the 
documentation of GRs and traditional knowledge associated with them in digital libraries is 
seen as something more enlightened than the significant extension of state’s control over them. 
Although arguably they lost much in the 2015 Biodiverisity Law, many of Brazil’s indigenous 
groups have by all accounts mounted a much stronger resistance against not only specific ABS 
terms, but against the idea of the commodification of GRs and traditional knowledge itself. 
Brazil has sometimes expressed concerns about the negative effects that may arise from such 
commodification in international fora, but for the most part it has distinguished itself as one of 
the leading supporters of biotechnology and of the Nagoya Protocol, even if it has yet to ratify 
the latter.   
 
It is difficult to ascertain what may happen in the future in this area of global governance. For 
now, it appears that China, India and Brazil have developed domestic systems regarding the 
utilisation of GRs that, although they inevitably bear the peculiarities of the socio-politico-
economic contexts to which they belong, could still provide the basis for continued 
collaboration in international GRs contests in the near future. If future ABS international 
instruments continue to provide leeway for domestic implementation, as it is highly likely, the 
differences of their domestic GR and ABS approaches should not provide cause for coalition 
splits. Homologating TRIPS and CBD via a TRIPS amendment is a much tougher call, not least 
because of the resistance of the US and some other key developed counterparts. It may prove 
to be the case that, if China, India and Brazil succeed in developing competitive biotech sectors 
of their own, they may become less concerned about GR disclosure of origin in patent 
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3 Indeed, they go back much further; although it is during the mid-20th century that issues 
pertaining to access to GRs and IP made a joint-entry into international policy regimes, they 
became inextricably linked from the 1500s onwards. A core feature of human history, the 
movement of plant genetic resources changed substantially with the rise of European 
colonialism and, especially, with the Great Columbian Exchange between the ‘New’ and ‘Old’ 
worlds from the early 1500s onwards. 
4  See FAO Resolutions 4/98, 5/98 and 3/91 at http://www.fao.org/Ag/cgrfa/iu.htm, last 
accessed on 25 January 2017.  
5 Apart from the fora discussed here, developing countries had been raising the issue of GRs in 
other international fora. Important among them was the conclusion of the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRA) at FAO in 2001. Brazil and 
India (China remains outside the treaty) alongside countries such as Mexico played a central 
role in securing a treaty that provides multilateral access to a wide repository of agricultural 
GRs. Just as the latter is crucial to avoiding diseases affecting agricultural produce due to the 
extremely narrow genetic material used in global food production currently, access to new, 




of the SARS epidemics, developing countries like China, Indonesia and others who had 
deposited pathogen strains at the WHO in line with international practices, saw no benefits from 
making available these GRs and threatened to withhold pathogen strain sharing in the future. 
6 For some early discussions along these lines see, for instance, communications from Brazil 
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African Group IP/C/W/206 (2000).  
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IP/C/W/195 and in 1999 and 2000. 
8  Thanks to the spread of Western IP norms, not least via TRIPS, the three criteria of 
patentability are that the invention be novel, non-obvious/involve an inventive step and be 
capable of industrial application.   
9 These negotiations culminated with the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing in 
2010; in force since 2014. 
10 Interview, two participants of the Mexican delegation to the Nagoya negotiations. Mexico 
City, 14. April, 2014. 
11 See the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
available at  https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/, last accessed on 25 January 2017.  
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Delhi, 16 January 2012. 
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Delhi, 16. January 2012. 
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18 Tu Youyou received the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 2015 for her work on artemisinin, which 
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21 Geographical Indications are a new form of IP; they are signs used on products that have a 
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22  See Foreign Economic Cooperation Office: https://www.cbd.int/business/nri/china.shtml, 
last accessed on 29 December 2016.  
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multinational Novartis in which the latter would claim all IP titles that could be realised by the 
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